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This paper discusses the events and happenings in Ghana within the first one 
hundred days of oil production. Using elite interviews and media reports, the 
paper chronicles several challenges and problems including lack of 
transparency, secrecy, consensus building, discontentment, etc that have 
occurred in the oil industry. Given that these were the same challenges that 
characterized the preparatory processes prior to oil production, the paper 
argues that the challenges and problems of the oil industry within the first 
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hundred days of oil production are not mere teething problems but signs of 
greater challenges to come. The paper concludes on the note that timeous 
and prompt solution to these challenges is crucial in ensuring that the oil 
becomes a blessing to the nation in so far as development and promotion of 
good governance and democracy are concerned 
Introduction 
Ghana officially commenced oil production in commercial quantities on the 
15th of December 2010. However, preparations prior to production in terms 
of the drafting of appropriate policy, legal and regulatory framework were 
weak (Gyampo, 2011). Indeed, the nation’s first oil production was 
undertaken without the guidance of any major legal and regulatory 
framework. Moreover, much effort was not made to ensure consensus 
building and transparency in the preparatory processes towards production 
culminating in a feeling of being sidelined in the preparatory processes by the 
opposition political parties and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (ibid). 
These gave credence to the paranoia that the country’s oil find could result in 
a curse. Within the first one hundred days of oil production, that is, from 15th 
December 2010 to 25th March 2011, several activities and events have taken 
place in Ghana’s emerging and nascent oil industry that gives cause for 
concern. These events do paint a picture of a gloomy future and negative 
impact of Ghana’s oil production on the country’s development as well as 
pollute her relatively peaceful democratic environment. On the other hand, it 
has also been argued that in every new and emerging oil economy, there are 
bound to be mistakes and teething problems that can be easily resolved with 
time (Paul, 2011). In this regard, the events that may have characterized the 
first one hundred days of oil production in Ghana may not be necessarily 
“life threatening”.  
Generally, the literature on natural resources have focused on how to sustain 
development in mineral economies (Auty, 1993) as well as the paradoxes 
associated with oil discoveries. In this regard the works of (Lynn, 1997), 
Gelb (1988), and Humphreys et al. (2007), come to mind.  Studies on 
Ghana’s oil discovery in commercial quantities have also mainly focussed on 
how to manage the expectations of people (Anaman, 2008; Asante, 2009); 
deal with potential sea-conflicts (Jonah, 2010); utilize the proceeds in order 
to save the country from the resource curse syndrome (Moss and Young, 
2009; Asafu-Adjaye, 2009); inter-sectoral impacts of oil production (Asafu-
Adjaye, 2010); as well as critical assessment of preparations that were made 
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before  oil production (Gyampo, 2011). Nonetheless, these studies have not 
focussed on how oil producing countries have fared and events that have 
occurred in these countries within the first few months of production. 
Importantly, a thorough analysis of events and happenings in an oil 
producing country within the first one hundred days of production, for 
instance, is crucial because it enables one to predict with some degree of 
certainty the future outcome of the oil find. It is in the light of this that this 
paper sets out to discuss and analyze events that have taken place in the first 
hundred days of oil production in Ghana. As coming events cast their 
shadows, this endeavour is useful in determining with some level of precision 
whether the activities that have taken place within the first one hundred days 
could heighten or reduce the possibility of the resource curse syndrome in 
Ghana. 
Theoretical Underpinning 
When state capacity is low and the abilities of the electorate to monitor and 
control government activities are weak as the experiences of crony or 
prebendal states illustrate, the discovery of natural resources in commercial 
quantities increases competition for control of the state. This leads to political 
violence and the use of state resources by those who control the state to 
maintain their hold on political power. In specific terms, state capacity 
denotes organizational coherence and expertise among the various agencies 
of the state that lead to the provision of policies and programmes for the 
benefit of the citizenry. The absence of state capacity is perhaps the main 
reason why many developing economies continue to lag behind in several 
human development indicators (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). In contrast, 
when a country is resource poor, there is less competition for state control 
which favors elite cooperation and the maintenance of democratic 
governance (Chaudhry, 1997). In a one party and no party settings, resource 
abundance allows the incumbents to increase their political support and 
consolidate their hold on political power. In essence, the more rents there are, 
the larger the electoral support for the incumbent government. The interesting 
case arises when the incumbent faces an opposition in a democratic political 
competition. In that case, abundance of resource rents may have crucial 
effects on the outcome of democratic elections and on democratic governance 
(Lam and Wantchekon, 1999). 
If the ability of the state to enforce the law is weak, the incumbent 
government will tend to have some discretionary power to generate rents and 
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to distribute these rents to citizens or/and voters. Such leaders tend to be less 
transparent in handling the proceeds of natural resources. As incumbents, 
they always have an informational advantage over the availability of the rents 
and allow it to alter the structure of the budget for electoral gains and not 
necessarily to activate developmental processes. Informational advantage and 
politicization of budgets can prove to be decisive in democratic elections and 
are likely to enhance incumbency advantage (Wantchekon, 2002). In a 
country like Norway, where budgetary procedures are transparent with 
limited discretion of the executive, natural resource discovery and abundance 
does not confer incumbency advantage. However, such transparency is 
lacking in a country like Nigeria, where the ruling political elites have often 
strived to use all corrupt means to siphon the oil money for their personal 
gains (ibid: 7). If the opposition is unable to resort to non-constitutional 
means such as political unrest to compete for political power, incumbency 
advantage persists over several electoral cycles and leads to one party 
dominance. This is the case in Botswana, where as a result of strong rule of 
law and political high-handedness, even perpetually losing parties have opted 
to abide by electoral outcomes (ibid: 9). However, when the opposition can 
use political unrest, one party dominance over oil resources could incite them 
to use illegal means such as riots or coups to compete for political power. 
Usually, the opposition criticizes the political elites for corruption, lack of 
transparency and marginalization. With these charges, they may be prepared 
to resort to unorthodox means to make the state ungovernable (ibid). The 
incumbent, anticipating this reaction of the opposition may choose to ban the 
opposition party or force this party to merge with the ruling party, thereby 
creating an authoritarian government (Yates, 1996). 
Natural resource discovery in abundance could therefore lead to a curse for 
one of the following reasons: (1) it could allow an already dominant or 
authoritarian party or a coalition of parties to extend its level of popular 
support and consolidate its hold on political power; (2) it could generate 
incumbency advantage and political instability, which could incite the 
incumbent to adopt repressive policies towards the opposition; (3) it could 
generate an open and extra-constitutional conflict (civil war), which could 
result in a dictatorship by the opposition party or the incumbent party as 
happened in former Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, and Liberia. Against this 
background, this paper stresses the importance of adequate preparations in a 
manner that ensures national consensus about how Ghana can manage her oil 
resources. This would minimize oil’s challenge to the country’s good 
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governance and democracy. However the argument that natural resource 
discovery could lead to a curse and threaten good governance and 
democracies, especially in developing countries is made real and tend to 
justify the kind of inadequate and opaque preparatory measures Ghana 
undertook prior to oil production (Gyampo, 2011). Ghana’s current situation 
fits the theoretical argument as advanced. This is shown in the opacity and 
marginalization of the opposition political parties as well as CSOs in the 
preparatory processes. (ibid). More importantly, a thorough analysis of 
events that have taken place within the first one hundred days of oil 
production in Ghana raises some skepticism about the future of Ghana’s oil 
production as a natural resource blessing. 
Analyzing Events that have taken Place in the first Hundred Days 
Ghana officially commenced oil production on 15th December 2010. 
However, all the issues raised in this paper regarding the weak preparations 
made, absence of a major legal and regulatory framework that would 
determine who can tap Ghana’s oil and the conditions and rules under which 
the resource could be tapped, as well as oil’s challenge to democracy and 
good governance have not been addressed. The ceremony to start the 
production graphically illustrated the potency of Ghana’s oil to divide and 
curse its citizenry. Somehow, the president and his staff failed to assign 
proper and meaningful roles to his predecessors (particularly former 
president J.A. Kufuor who played a significant role in getting the investors to 
invest in the oil industry during his administration, from 2001 to 2009) 
during this all-important ceremony. Again, the flag bearer and leader of the 
largest opposition party in Ghana, Nana Akufo Addo, was not invited to the 
ceremony. This has heightened the feeling of neglect and marginalization by 
the opposition in Ghana’s emerging oil economy. Without serious efforts to 
deal with these challenges, the nation may be sitting on a time-bomb. 
Moreover, parliament fully passed the Petroleum Revenue Management Bill 
(PRMB) after several amendments on 2nd March 2011. The memorandum 
that accompanied the Bill indicated that it was aimed at providing a 
framework to guide the efficient collection, allocation and management of 
petroleum revenue for the benefit of current and future generations of 
Ghanaians (Draft P.R.M.B, 2011). The Bill was to also ensure the overall 
management of petroleum revenue based on sound and sustainable fiscal 
policies that transcends political regimes as well as ensure a provision of a 
clear assignment of responsibilities, from collection to final utilization of 
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petroleum revenue within a transparent and accountable framework (Daily 
Graphic, 2011:1-2). The key features of the Bill are the establishment of the 
Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) and the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF). The 
GSF is to cushion the impact of price variations on the public or cushion 
public expenditure capacity during periods of high prices and adverse 
production changes, while the GHF will provide an endowment to support 
the welfare of future generations after the underground petroleum has been 
depleted (Draft P.RM.B, 2011: 8). Both Funds are collectively referred to as 
the Ghana Petroleum Funds (ibid). 
Given the potency of inappropriate and improper management of revenues 
from natural resources to create chaos, confusion and derail the development 
of the state as has been witnessed in many countries, such as Nigeria and 
Sudan. The passage of the PRMB, though belated, was crucial. However, as 
the situation was in the preparatory processes prior to oil production, there 
was not much consensus reached on several issues in the passage of the bill, a 
situation that creates a serious recipe for conflict (Daily Graphic, 2011:3). 
CSOs and the minority opposition parties in parliament severely criticized 
their marginalization in the processes towards the drafting of the bill. The 
minority again vehemently opposed the blanket collateralization of Ghana's 
future oil revenue which was contained in clause 5 of the Bill. The 
controversial Clause 5 of the PRMB - which initially stated that future 
revenues from oil could not be collateralized and which government sought 
to amend to allow for collateralization, generated heated debates from the 
two leading political parties in Ghana’s parliament. The ruling majority, 
however, insisted on amending the bill to allow the state to use oil revenues 
as collateral in accessing loans in flagrant disregard of the views of about 80 
percent of Ghanaians who opposed the use of oil revenue as collateral 
(Kennedy, 2010). Indeed, many people in the Western Region of Ghana have 
since expressed disappointment at parliament’s decision to permit oil-backed 
loans (Daily Guide, 2010:18). Apart from the argument that if government is 
allowed to collateralize the oil revenue, there will be indiscriminate 
borrowing which could create problems for the country’s economy in the 
future, there is another latent reason why the opposition parties have kicked 
against collateralization. They have argued that it could be used as a 
mechanism to perpetuate the ruling elites in power in the sense that it gives 
them access to loans which could be “misused” for political benefits. They 
have therefore pledged to “match the ruling party boot-for boot” and ensure 
that it does not use its access to such oil-backed loans to its advantage in the 
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2012 elections. Needless to say, such determination psyches and prepares 
political apparatchiks and party foot-soldiers for conflict. 
One other issue that generated intense debate in Ghana’s Parliament during 
the passage of the PRMB was the request by the chiefs and people of the 
Western Region for the allocation of ten percent of the oil revenue into a 
fund for the sole development of the region. The attempt to reach consensus 
on this was unsuccessful. While the majority kicked against the request on 
grounds of its potency to breed divisive tendencies in the country (even 
though the sitting vice president, John Dramani Mahama, on an earlier 
electioneering campaign trip in the Western Region promised them a ten 
percent share of the oil revenue), the minority argued that even though the 
Western Region is endowed with several natural resources and contributes 
immensely towards the nation’s development, no serious effort has been 
made to develop the area by successive regimes. Again, the minority argued 
that since the people of the Region were going to experience and bear the 
direct brunt of oil production in terms of its adverse environmental impact as 
the experiences of mining communities show in Ghana and in the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria, their call for ten percent of oil revenue was legitimate and 
had to be incorporated in the PRMB. However, with the typical adversarial 
style that characterizes the conduct of many parliamentary sessions and 
proceedings, the majority hastily voted against this position and left the 
minority with no option than to threaten a court action (Daily Graphic, 
2011:1-2). This has created discontentment among the chiefs and people of 
the Western Region (ibid: 3). It would therefore not be surprising if they 
resort to acts that could sabotage the oil industry and threaten the peace of the 
area. This is because they vowed to resist any attempt to drill oil in the area 
without meeting their request during the preparatory processes towards oil 
production (Gyampo, 2011:12). 
Meanwhile, the passage of the PRMB was scheduled to take place hand in 
hand with the passage of the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill 
(PEPB) to provide a legislative framework for oil exploration and production 
(Fuseini, 2011). Indeed, some have even argued that the latter should have 
been passed long before the former. As the situation stood within the first 
hundred days of oil production, there was no law to guide oil exploration and 
production in Ghana. Who qualifies to explore oil, how to deal with 
environmental impact of oil production and spillage issues were oblivious to 
First One Hundred Days of Oil Production in Ghana 
 
Copyright © IAARR 2011: www.afrrevjo.com                                                  23 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Ghanaians even though oil production in commercial quantities had 
commenced in full scale. 
Furthermore, Kosmos Energy, a partner in Ghana's oil industry, within the 
period under review decided to sell its share in the Jubilee Oil Field through 
an Initial Public Offer (IPO) in the US, rather than selling it to the Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). This meant that the GNPC had to 
compete for the Kosmos shares on the international market, if it still had 
interest. The GNPC, which holds 13.75 percent interest in the Jubilee Oil 
Field, last year decided to buy Kosmos Energy's 23.49 shares to increase its 
stake in the oil find, and the government decided to source for funds from 
China for this purpose (Ghanaian Times, 2011:1-3). However, at a press 
conference organized in Accra on 10th March 2011 and addressed by Ato 
Ahwoi, the Board Chairman of GPNC, he expressed disappointment about 
the attitude of Kosmos Energy and noted that “GNPC has made several 
contacts and negotiated with Kosmos Energy but it has refused to sell its 
shares to us, and it want to do it through an IPO America. Hence, the idea of 
GNPC buying the Kosmos Energy shares is closed for now." Even though it 
is conceded that Kosmos Energy has the right to decide who to sell its share 
to, some Ghanaians have argued that the GNPC should have been given the 
opportunity to buy the shares as has happened in other oil producing 
countries to create a semblance of national ownership of such natural 
resources. In Nigeria, for instance, the Royal Dutch Shell PLC sold four of its 
on-shore oil blocks to local oil producers eager to snap up Western oil 
major’s properties as unrest in North Africa and the Middle East had boosted 
global crude prices (Public Agenda, 2011:7).  
Another major challenge is that even though officials were aware of Ghana’s 
fortunes to join the oil producing countries, no effort was made to boost the 
capacity of the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) to be able to refine oil produced 
within the country. This did not taken place within the first hundred days and 
one is not sure whether it would be done at all. Technically, even though an 
oil refinery exists, it has no capacity to refine the country’s oil (Ahwoi, 
2011). Given the Ghanaian parliament’s seeming unwillingness to pass the 
Right to Information Bill, Ghanaians have been kept oblivious regarding the 
quantity of oil sent out for refinery and the actual quantity that is refined. 
Moreover, there seem to be conflict of information about exactly how much 
Ghana’s oil is sold on the international market. In January 2010, it was 
rumoured that Ghana’ oil was sold below the world market price (USD 70 
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per barrel as against USD 90) even though Ghana’s oil is of higher quality 
than most oil being sold on the world market. Officials and the Jubilee 
Partners (Tullow Oil, Kosmos Energy, E.O Group, Anadarko and GNPC) 
have, however, refused to publicly disclose exactly how much Ghana’s oil is 
sold on the world market, giving room for speculations and uncertainties. No 
effort has also been made within the first hundred days of oil production to 
publicly disclose the royalties paid to the nation by The Jubilee Partners. This 
has created suspicion among political elites of the opposition parties. Ghana 
earned approximately a hundred and ten million dollars from the sale of its 
first share of crude oil from the Jubilee Field. The GNPC’s lifting of a total 
of 995,259 barrels of oil came after three previous consignments had been 
taken by Tullow Oil and the other partners in the venture (Ahwoi, 2011). 
Even though what the nation earned from the lifting and sale of her oil is 
known, the royalties that have accrued the nation from the lifting and sale of 
oil by the other Jubilee Partners remain unknown. Unfortunately, the many 
Ghanaians who have been “kept in the dark” have been silent either because 
of apathy or ignorance and have not questioned the political leaders about 
their lack of information particularly regarding the exact proceeds in terms of 
royalties from the sale of  the oil. With this deficiency, the citizenry are 
unable to monitor and control the activities of government in so far as issues 
relating to oil revenue are concerned.  The tendency for this situation to erupt 
into violence after gullible supporters of the opposition have been incited to 
demand their fair share of the oil revenues as well as the use of resource rents 
by those who control the state to maintain their hold on political power 
becomes imminent under such conditions of secrecy. The current situation 
creates room for embezzlement, and misappropriation as well as other 
corrupting deals with the nation’s oil resources by unscrupulous leaders 
(Manteaw, 2009). Within the period under review, the natural resource seems 
to have conferred some incumbency advantage over the political elites in 
power. Given the phenomenal institutional weakness in Ghana, leaders have 
exercised their discretion regarding which information about the oil revenue 
they would disclose and which one they would conceal from the people. 
Unfortunately, these are the tendencies that have led to conflict and 
threatened the existence of several oil producing states (Gyampo, 2011).  
Another significant happening within the first hundred days of oil production 
in Ghana was rent price hikes or increases in rent advance and the ejection of 
tenants who could not afford the new rent rates by their land lords/ladies. The 
monthly rent of an average apartment in Takoradi, the capital town of the 
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Western Region where the oil is produced, was increased from GH¢50 to 
GH¢500 and tenants were asked to pay three years rent advance in 
contravention of the nation’s rent control regulations (Arthur, 2011). A single 
plot of land that was sold for GH¢1,500 before the commencement of oil 
production was increased to GH¢10,000 (Daily Guide, 2010:18). Some local 
and indigenous inhabitants who were unable to pay these increases, 
particularly regarding the rents for accommodation lost their rooms and 
apartments to foreign investors who could afford to pay such huge rent 
increases. This has created disenchantment among several residents of 
Takoradi, particularly those who have lost their accommodation to foreign 
investors (Arthur, 2011). Given the country’s huge housing deficit, any move 
to worsen the problem must not be tolerated. Again, the seeming 
unwillingness and inability of the government to enforce its rent control 
regulations could lead to a revolt among those who have lost their 
accommodation against the state or create conflict between them and the 
foreign investors in a manner that could sacrifice the peace of the region and 
ward-off investors. 
There were also been reported clashes between state security agencies and 
fisher folks in the oil prospecting area. Instances have been recounted when 
fishermen returning from sea in Essiama in the Western Region of the 
country were accosted by the navy, beaten up and their catch taken away 
from them (Jonah, 2010). In such instances, the poor fishermen had no 
recourse to justice.  Even though this occurred in the preparatory process 
towards oil production in Ghana, it did not cease within the period under 
review and there seem to be no serious effort to deal with it. The situation 
raises concern about a looming sea-use conflict.  
Last but not least, the country seemed to have intensified her effort to explore 
more oil within the period under review. Key projects that were commenced 
include the appraisal of the Tweneboah Complex, the ENI Sankofa and 
Deepwater Tano Block. For the implementation of the exploratory activities, 
an amount of GH¢ 405,495,572.00 was allocated (Budget Statement, 2011: 
90). Much as this initiative is commendable, the state has not done well in 
empowering Ghanaians to be active participants in the oil exploration 
process. In Uganda, for instance, the government has committed itself to a 
policy of putting in place domestic industrial infrastructure which would 
guarantee a significant role for Ugandan entrepreneurs in the exploration and 
management of crude oil deposits in the country. Without this arrangement, 
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the government has decided not to be in haste to export the nation’s crude oil 
(Paul, 2011).  Unfortunately, in Ghana, a "Local Content and Local 
Participation in Petroleum Activities - Policy Framework", which indicates 
the desire of government to ensure that the control (about 90 percent), as well 
as benefits in the oil and gas discovery and production will remain with 
Ghanaians by the year 2020, was still not fully in place within the period 
under review (ibid).  Even though some have argued that it is unrealistic to 
have the kind of local content policy being proposed, government has not 
shown any sign of commitment in making such policy proposal realistic.  
Conclusion 
The first one hundred days of oil production in Ghana was saddled with 
several challenges and happenings that create scepticism about the 
contributions of oil to Ghana’s development, democracy and relative peace 
and tranquillity. With hindsight of the adage that coming events cast their 
shadows, it is reasonably fair and plausible to argue that the current lapses in 
Ghana’s emerging oil industry represents a sign of major difficulties and 
problems ahead. To be fair, others have also argued that the happenings 
within the first hundred days of oil production are mere teething problems of 
the Ghanaian infant oil industry that may be resolved in a matter of time. 
However, it is important to point to the fact that there were many lapses in 
the preparatory processes prior the nation’s production of oil which were left 
unattended to. Given the weak preparatory processes, lack of consensus, as 
well as transparency, Ghana was deemed unprepared and not ready to embark 
on her oil production (Gyampo, 2011). In spite of these challenges, the nation 
went ahead to pump and export her first oil. Hundred days of oil production 
has lapsed and issues about lack of transparency, secrecy, consensus 
building, insufficient legislative frameworks, ignorance, apathy as well as 
discontents among a section of the Ghanaian population, particularly those 
from the Western Region continue to be a matter of grave concern to many 
Ghanaians. If these were some of the problems that led to conflict in many oil 
producing countries in Africa, such as Chad, Sudan, and Nigeria, one may 
not be far from wrong in saying that Ghana may gradually be inching 
towards conflict should there be complacency and failure to promptly deal 
with the challenges before they become deep seated and assume hydra-
headedness and be the recipe for political implosion. 
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